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Arbitration as a Remedy in Labor Disputes
William F. Powers*
L ABOR ARBITRATION is a proceeding presided over by one or more indi-
viduals, selected by the parties, for the determination of a labor
dispute arising under a collective bargaining agreement between the
employer and a labor organization, acting as representative of the em-
ployee.' The arbitration process purports to be a system of industrial
... self government created by and confined to the parties. ." .,... in
lieu of a judicial proceeding." 3 The object of arbitration is the final dis-
position of the dispute in a non-technical, less expensive and more ex-
peditious manner, by persons having expertise in labor management
relations. 4
Labor arbitration should not be categorized as a substitute for
litigation.5 Labor arbitration is a device which "[Slubstitutes the judg-
* Member of the Cleveland, Ohio Bar.
' Trotta, Labor Arbitration, 32 (1961); Braun, Labor Disputes and Their Settlement,
149 (1955); CCH Lab. L. Rep. § 57,001, at 81011.
2 Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 999, at
1016 (1955). The Supreme Court rendered approval of the arbitration process "as
the heart of industrial self government": United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior
& Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1409, 46 L.R.R.M. 2416
(1930); Congress, by passage of the Taft-Hartley Act (Labor Management Relations
Act) § 203(d), 61 Stat. 153 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 173(d) demonstrated its intent to favor
arbitration as a method of settling industrial disputes
[F]inal adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties . . . is the most
desired method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over application or
interpretation of an existing collective bargaining agreement.
3 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arbitration and Award § 1, 519; Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbi-
tration, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1482 (1959). The arbitration process can be viewed as a
private proceeding designed by the parties for the purpose of serving their require-
ments. But, pragmatically, the arbitration system is acquiring more of the judicial
trappings and procedural requirements, which the system sought to circumvent;
Fleming, The Labor Arbitration Process: 1943-1963, 52 Ky. L.J. 817 (1964).
In Goldberg, A Supreme Court Justice Looks at Arbitration, 20 Arb. J. 13
(1965), Justice Goldberg recognized that the criticism of the arbitration process
was partially justified and warned the supporters of this system to guard against its
resembling the "tortuous course of litigation." Stephen Vladeck, lecture, Seminar in
Labor Arbitration, New York University Graduate School, Dec. 2, 1968 stated:
"The more the courts compel arbitration to resemble the procedure of the courts,
the less effective the arbitration process will become." Professor Vladeck, on
Dec. 16, 1968, stated that, "The parties have created their own forum with
their own rules in order to resolve a dispute arising during the life of the col-
lective contract concerning the application or interpretation of such contract."
Thus, "arbitration process is a child of the parties and [as such] must articulate
their intent. If the parties keep to their agreement, that arbitration is to be a
private proceeding between themselves, then that is what it will be-private."
But, "as soon as one of the parties seek review of the proceedings, then the
privateness has been lost."
4 Trotta, supra note 1, at 33; Goldberg, supra note 3, see generally.
5 Goldberg, supra note 3, at 14.
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ment of a third party for the use of economic force." 6 In 1957 the United
States Supreme Court, in Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama,7
judicially accepted the arbitration of labor disputes as being within the
scope of the national labor policy. The substitution of peaceful pro-
cedures for economic force in a labor dispute in order to "promote indus-
trial peace" 8 was encouraged by the court.
The arbitrator of labor disputes is "[P]art of the system of self-
government created and confined to the parties. He serves their pleasure
only to administer the rules established by their collective agreement." 9
The arbitrator is created by the parties for their own purposes and the
parties themselves are the source of the arbitrator's power, through the
labor contract.'0 He cannot "innovate" or impose upon the parties his
own "social or economic philosophy." 11 "An arbitrator is chosen to de-
termine whether there has been a violation of the contractual agreement.
Usually, though not always, violation of the agreement is followed by
some kind of remedial order." 12
Arbitrators are of two distinct types: temporary and permanent.
The permanent arbitrator is an individual selected for the length of the
collective bargaining agreement or some other specific period of time.
The temporary or "ad hoc" arbitrator is usually employed by the parties
for hearing specific disputes.13
The Federal Courts did not possess the power to enforce agreements
to arbitrate labor disputes until Congress passed the Labor Management
Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) in 1947.14 Congressional intent favor-
ing the voluntary arbitration of labor disputes is proclaimed in Sec. 203
6 Id. at 14.
7 353 U.S. 448, 77 S. Ct. 912, 1 L. Ed. 2d 972 (1957).
8 Id. at 454; see also Fleming, Arbitrators and The Remedy Power, 48 Va. L. Rev.
1199 (1962); Drake Bakeries v. Local 50, Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. 254, 263, 82 S. Ct.
1346, 8 L. Ed. 2d 474, 50 L.R.R.M. 2440 (1962), the court stressed that the best
method to settle labor disputes is one that is agreed to by the parties.
9 Shulman, supra note 2, at 1024.
10 M. Beatty, Labor Management Arbitration Manual, at 109 (1960); Proceedings of
the 13th Annual Meeting of the Nat'l Academy of Arbitrators Jan. 27-29th (1960),
see I. Bernstein's discussion at 49-50. This commentator is of the opinion that
arbitrators are of two types, "strict constructionists" whereby his sole power is de-
rived from the contract, and "broad constructionists" who attempt to fashion an
award that will both be within the contractual intent and still provide equitable
relief. For a discussion of the broad constructionist position, see generally E. Stein,
Remedies in Labor Arbitration, in Proceedings of the 13th Annual Meeting of the
Nat'l Academy of Arbitrators 1960 (published by B.N.A.), at 45, Professor Stein is
of the opinion that an arbitrator's powers "should equal" those powers available to
a court of equity and "that the arbitrator ought to be empowered to direct what-
ever is necessary to right the situation" before him.
11 Beatty, supra note 10, at 109.
12 Fleming, supra note 8, at 1222.
13 CCH Lab. L. Rep., Union Contracts Arbitration § 57,040, 81,043-047.
14 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq., hereinafter cited as L.M.R.A.
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(d) of L.M.R.A. 15 Federal courts were granted jurisdiction over actions
to enforce agreements to arbitrate by Sec. 301 (a) of the L.M.R.A. 16 The
Supreme Court held in the Lincoln Mills case 1 7 that agreements to arbi-
trate were specifically enforceable in a federal forum and that Sec. 301
granted the federal courts authority to fashion federal substantive law
consistent with the national labor policy of substituting peaceful meth-
ods for disruptive economic pressures in the settlement of labor dis-
putes.18
In light of this federal policy favoring the enforcement of agree-
ments to arbitrate labor disputes the question of what issues are arbi-
trable arises. The Lincoln Mills decision favoring arbitration as the
method that best effectuates the federal labor policy has been extended
by a series of cases known as the Steelworkers Trilogy 9 to cases arising
out of Sec. 301 of the L.M.R.A. Section 301 requires federal courts:
(a) to fashion substantive law for enforcement of collective bargaining
agreements and (b) to afford a means by which agreements to arbitrate
could be enforced by the federal courts. Prior to the Steelworkers
Trilogy, the federal courts held that the questions of arbitrability and the
arbitrators remedy power were questions of law for the court and not
for the arbitrator to decide.
In the first case the United States Supreme Court in Steelworkers v.
Warrior Gulf Navigation stated that Sec. 301 of the L.M.R.A. "assigned
the courts the duty of determining whether the reluctant party has
breached his promise to arbitrate." 20 The Court reasoned that a party
cannot be forced to arbitrate a dispute, which he has not agreed by con-
tract to submit to arbitration. All other disputes between the parties, not
specifically excluded,21 are within the arbitration provision and as such
are questions "for the arbiter, not for the court." 22 "Doubts [as to
15 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1947).
16 61 Stat. 156 (1947); 29 U.S.C. §185(a) (1947):
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
... in an industry affecting commerce . . . may be brought in any district court
of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties....
17 Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, supra note 7, at 457,
Federal interpretation of the federal law will govern not state law. But state
law, if compatible with the purpose of § 301, may be resorted to in order to find"
the rule that will best effectuate the federal policy. Any state law applied,
however, will be absorbed as federal law and will not be an independent source
of private rights.
18 Id. at 455.
19 United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 80 S.Ct. 1343,
4 L. Ed. 2d 1403, 46 L.R.R.M. 2414 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. War-
rior & Gulf Navigation Co., op. cit. supra note 2; United Steelworkers of America v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 80 S. Ct. 1358, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1424, 46
L.R.R.M. 2423 (1960).
20 363 U.S. 574, at 582.
21 See discussion of submission and stipulation agreements, infra, note 37.
22 Supra note 20, at 585.
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whether the dispute is arbitrable] should be resolved in favor of cover-
age." 23 Courts should not deny an order to arbitrate the dispute unless
they can say "with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not
susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute." 24
Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing held that where "[t]he
parties have agreed to submit all questions of contract interpretation to
the arbitrator," the court is "confined to ascertaining whether the . . .
claim ... on its face is governed by the contract." 25 The parties have
bargained for the arbitrator's interpretation and not the courts, thus, the
courts are restricted from looking into the merits of the dispute. The
standard arbitration clause makes every grievance arbitrable which
alleges a breach of the collective contract. Since courts cannot reject
the contractual basis of the claim as being frivolous without evaluating
the merits or substantive basis of the dispute, the court in doing so
"usurps a function which . . . is entrusted to the arbitration tribunal." 26
Judicial inquiry pursuant to Sec. 301 is confined to whether a col-
lective bargaining agreement exists, whether the agreement contains an
arbitration clause, and whether the parties agree in the clause to arbi-
trate the dispute at issue.2 7 Any other inquiry would be inconsistent
with the peaceful settlement of labor disputes through grievance arbi-
tration.
A continuing problem arises when the arbitration clause is more re-
strictive than the standard clause. The courts then must construe the
contractual language that limits the promise to arbitrate. The courts in
determining arbitrability of a dispute must exercise caution so they do
not encroach upon the "merits" of the grievance in determining whether
the particular issue is within the limiting contractual language.28
State vs. Federal Jurisdiction
The next question is whether Sec. 301 pre-empts state court juris-
diction in actions seeking enforcement of the arbitration agreement. In
Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney,29 the Supreme Court held that suits based
23 Id. at 583.
24 Id. at 582-3.
25 363 U.S. 564, at 567-8.
26 Id. at 569.
27 Strutz, Arbitrators and their Remedy Power, in Proceedings of the 16th Annual
Meeting of the National Academy of Arbitrators § 4 (M. Kalk, ed. 1963).
28 Lesnick, Arbitration as a Limit of the Discretion of Management, Union and
N.L.R.B., N.Y.U. 18th Conf. on Lab. See also, Telephone Co. v. Communications
Workers, 51 L.R.R.M. 2405 (1962).
29 368 U.S. 502, 507, 82 S. Ct. 519, 7 L. Ed. 2d 483, 46 L.R.R.M. 2619 (1962).
State courts can exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts in cases
arising under federal law where state jurisdiction is not excluded by express
provisions of the federal stature or by incompatibility in its exercise arising
from the nature of the particular case . . .Exclusive federal jurisdiction over
cases arising under federal law has been the exception and not the rule.
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on Sec. 301 may be brought in state as well as federal courts. The Su-
preme Court further held in Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucus Flour
Co.,30 that state courts must apply federal substantive law in an area
covered by the federal labor law. Thus local law must give way to the
principles of federal labor law unless it is compatible with the purpose
of Sec. 301.31
After the issue of arbitrability has affirmatively been decided any
procedural questions arising from the dispute which relate to the deter-
mination of the dispute should be left to the arbitrator. Thus, the Su-
preme Court held in John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston32 that "procedural
arbitrability" rests with the arbitrator and not the courts. The reason-
ing of the court was that most labor disputes "cannot be broken down
so easily into their 'substantive' and 'procedural' aspects." 33 The court's
role apparently ends once it determines that the substantive dispute is
arbitrable. Procedural disagreements therefore are not regarded "as
separate disputes but as aspects of the dispute which called the griev-
ance procedure into play." 34
The Supreme Court in Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel stated that
the arbitrator "is to bring his informed judgment to bear in order to
reach a fair solution of a problem. This is especially true when it comes
to formulating remedies." 31 The courts will deny enforcement of the
award when the arbitrator's award is not within the framework of the
contract.36
The parties can extend or limit the remedy powers of the arbitrator
through the bargaining agreement.37 Thus the stipulation agreement 38
can be used by the parties to resolve the arbitrator's authority to award
remedial relief where the collective bargaining contract does not refer
30 369 U.S. 95, 82 S. Ct. 571, 7 L. Ed. 2d 593, 49 L.R.R.M. 2717 (1962).
31 Id. at 104. See also, McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters,
49 Cal. 2d 45, 315 P. 2d 322 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932, 41 L.R.R.M. 2431 (1958).
32 376 U.S. 543, 84 S. Ct. 909, 11 L. Ed. 2d 898 (1964).
33 Id. at 556.
34 Id. at 559. For discussion of procedural arbitrability in detail see Note, 73 Yale
L.J. 1459 (1964).
35 Supra note 19, at 597; 363 U.S. 593, at 597.
36 Id.
37 Torrington Co. v. Metal Workers Local 1645, 362 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1966), 62
L.R.R.M. 2495; Stein, supra note 10, at 48.
Commentators many times refer to the submission and the stipulation agree-
ments as being one and the same. This is a technical error in definition. But, cf.,
Vladeck, lecture (Nov. 4, 1968) quoted here generally. A submission is merely a
statement of the issue. The stipulation is an agreement between the parties as to
the specific questions to be resolved by the arbitrator. The stipulation limits the
arbitrator's authority to hear only those questions. The stipulation thus modifies the
collective agreement for that particular case.
38 See discussion, supra note 37.
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to remedies. If the parties agree on a limitation or circumscription of the
arbitrator's authority, he is bound by their stipulation and may not de-
part from its limitations. The parties are in fact arbitrating under the
stipulation and not the collective contract as the source of the arbitra-
tor's authority.3 9
The standards under which the arbitration is conducted are another
source of the arbitrator's remedy power if the parties agree to be bound
by them. These standards are procedural and are generally referred to
in the contract. If the contract is silent then the parties can agree on
application of agency standards, such as those of the American Arbitra-
tion Association.
40
The New York Court of Appeals41 upheld an arbitrator's award for
specific performance of a personal service contract because the parties
had agreed to be bound by a rule authorizing the arbitrator to grant any
remedy which he "deemed just and equitable." The proceeding was con-
ducted by the American Arbitration Association pursuant to this rule.
Broad contractual language allows the arbitrator to exercise wide
latitude in fashioning an appropriate relief. The parties have bargained
for the arbitrator's remedy.4 2 If the parties do not want the arbitrator
to exercise such latitude in devising an appropriate remedy they can
limit his power by a stipulation or submission agreement or by proper
restrictions in the underlying contract. Thus the arbitrator has power
unless the contract specifically negates such power to award remedies.
The problem arises where contractual language is not available concern-
ing remedial power and the parties cannot agree what power the arbi-
trator has to fashion a remedy.
Prior to the "Trilogy," one court held that the arbitrator was not
authorized to award relief not expressly provided for in the contract.
43
The substantial impact of the "Trilogy" caused this same court to take
another look at this problem. That court then held in Lodge No. 12
Machinists v. Cameron Iron Works, Inc.4 4 that the arbitrator, upon find-
ing a breach of the collective bargaining contract, has implied power to
fashion a remedy unless restrictive language exists in the contract ne-
39 Vladeck, lecture, Nov. 4, 1968, supra note 37.
40 CCH Lab. L. Rep. 1 Union Contracts Arbitration, 11 57,099. See, for procedural
standards approved by the American Arbitration Assoc.
41 Staklinski v. Pyramid Electric Co., 6 N.Y.2d 159, 160 N.E.2d 78 (1959).
42 Teamsters v. Lucas Flour, supra note 30, at 96. See example of broad arbitration
clause:
Should any difference arise between employer and the employee, same shall
be submitted to arbitration by both parties . . . they shall mutually appoint a
third person whose decision shall be final and binding.
43 Refining Employees Union v. Continental Oil Co., 268 F.2d 447 (5th Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896 (1959).
44 292 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1961), 48 L.R.R.M. 2516, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 926 (1961).
49 L.R.R.M. 2173.
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gating such power. The Supreme Court extended this rule in Drake
Bakeries Inc. v. Local 50, Am. Bakery Workers45 by holding that where
the arbitration clause is broad the arbitrator's power to afford a remedy
is implied.
Commentators are of the opinion that the remedy power of the arbi-
trator has been broadened and expanded to deal with a situation as he
finds it.46 He may fashion solutions which previously have not been
within his powers. It has been held that the national labor policy is only
carried out when the collective bargaining agreement is given latitude.47
What types of remedial powers are available to the arbitrator?
Fleming categorizes the arbitrator's remedy power into three types: (1)
damages, (2) specific performance, and (3) injunctive relief.48 He also
states the "most common type of remedy involves compensatory dam-
ages." 4 The arbitrator has no trouble in awarding a remedy in dam-
ages when he is authorized by the parties to do so.
One court, in Minute Maid Co. v. Citrus Workers Local 444,50 held
even where the contract is silent regarding the remedy power available
to the arbitrator he may award back pay to employees discharged un-justly, even for a period beyond the termination date of the contract.
Evidently the contractual authority to reinstate an employee unjustly
discharged carries with it the power to make the employee whole
through damages in the form of back pay. The most prominent excep-
tions to this rule are: (1) where a damage claim arises out of a violation
of a no-strike clause, and (2) when the arbitrator's award is thought to
be against public policy or contrary to statute.51
The commentators do not find justification for an award of punitive
damages. Their basic opposition is that the parties have a continuing
relationship pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement which "can-
not operate effectively unless the parties have a basic desire to live to-
gether." 52 Punitive damages by their very definition are assessed as
a punishment for aggravated violations of the contract. Thus it is only
logical to assume that such an award would cause hostility between the
45 370 U.S. 254, 82 S. Ct. 1346, 8 L. Ed. 2d 474, 50 L.R.R.M. 2440 (1962). See also,Fleming, Arbitrators and the Remedy Power, 48 Va. L.R. 1199, at 1214 (1962).
46 Stein, Remedies in Labor Arbitration, in Proceedings of the 13th Annual Meeting
of the Nat'l. Academy of Arbitrators (published by BNA).
47 Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Independent Industrial Workers, 337 F.2d 321 (5thCir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 952, 85 S. Ct. 1084, 13 L. Ed. 2d 969, 61 L.R.R.M. 2410.
4s Fleming, supra note 45, at 1202.
49 Id. at 1202.
50 331 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1964); 49 CCH Lab. L. Rep. 18,935.
51 Fleming, supra note 45, at 1202-03.
52 Stein, supra note 46, at 45. See also, Fleming, supra note 45, at 1221; Strutz,
Arbitrators and Their Remedy Power, 16th Annual Meeting of the Nat'l Academy
of Arbitrators 54 (M. Kalk, ed. 1963).
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parties and destroy their willingness to live together pursuant to the
labor contract.53
It is evident that the parties can agree to liquidated damages as
a remedy. If this is the parties' intent the arbitrator will be empowered
to award them where he finds an appropriate violation of the contract.
54
An arbitrator cannot award a remedy which is in violation of law;
one court has held that such a remedy is against public policy and thus
is not enforceable by the courts. 55 In that case the arbitrator reinstated
an employee who had been prosecuted and convicted of a misdemeanor
(gambling) while on his employer's premises. The arbitrator was of the
opinion that the penalty of summary discharge was too severe and
awarded reinstatement without back pay. The court held that they could
not go to the merits, as the arbitrator's decision on questions of fact is
not reviewable. The court reasoned, however, that the collective bar-
gaining contract and the arbitrator's authority pursuant to it are limited
by and must yield to the over-riding public policy. Arbitrators, being
"creatures of contract," are "no more above public law than the parties
from whom they derive their powers." 56
Another Federal District Court has held that arbitrators pursuant
to the contract may arbitrate whether an employee was discharged for
cause, because of his violation of a state gambling law, disregarding the
existence of the state public policy against gambling. The rationale of the
court was that state public policy must yield to the substantive principles
of the national labor law.57 There is also a federal case holding that an
arbitration award will be refused judicial enforcement if it is contrary
to state public policy, only when such policy has been clearly shown to
exist. Thus where the state public policy is not clear the court applying
federal law cannot take account of it.5 8 It is this writer's opinion that
these cases cannot be reconciled with the Enterprise Wheel case for the
reason that in order for the courts to determine the violation of public
policy they must of necessity examine the substantive merits of the dis-
pute. The courts in doing so are encroaching within the arbitrator's
jurisdiction.
Beside damages the arbitrator has the power to render awards of
specific performance and provide for injunctive relief pursuant to his
contractual authority. The problem arises in connection with a party's
53 United Auto Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 653 (1958).
54 Fleming, supra note 45, at 1202.
55 Local 453 Electrical Workers v. Otis Elevator Co., 201 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y.
1962); See generally Blumrosen, Public Policy Considerations in Labor Arbitration
Cases, 14 Rutgers L. Rev. 217 (1960).
56 Id. at 218.
57 Jenkins Bros. v. Local 5623, Steelworkers 56 L.R.R.M. 2058 (D.C. Conn. 1964).
58 U.A.W., Local 985 v. Chace Co., 64 L.R.R.M. 2098 (E.D. Mich. 1966).
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request for injunctive relief which is sought to restore or retain the
status quo pending the arbitration of the contractual violation. The Su-
preme Court interpreted that the legislative intent behind Sec. 301 was
that federal courts should enforce agreements to arbitrate. "Plainly the
agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is the quid pro quo for an
agreement not to strike." 59 In Lucus FlourG0 the Supreme Court held
that because the parties agree contractually to submit the dispute to the
arbitrator, a no-strike clause would be implied to exist. This rule was
further extended in Drake Bakeries61 by the holding that an action for
damages in federal court could be stayed, pending the arbitration of the
damage claim, where the contract could be interpreted as giving the
arbitrator authority over the claim. Thus, from the cases discussed, it
seems that the arbitrator's contractual authority to provide for remedies
applies to granting injunctive relief for violation of a no-strike clause,
and more important, that the courts would enforce such remedies by
cease and desist orders against the party in violation of the contract.
This application of the case law was all but destroyed by the court
in the case of Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson.6 2 The court held that
Sec. 4 of the Norris-La Guardia Act was not amended by Sec. 301 of
L.M.R.A. The federal courts are therefore prohibited by Norris-
La Guardia from enforcing an injunction, even though the labor contract
contains a no-strike clause. The rationale was that federal courts cannot
issue injunctions in labor disputes and that Sec. 301 did not amend or
repeal the Norris prohibition against the use of the injunction. Justice
Brennan, dissenting in Sinclair, argued that the injunction was the only
appropriate relief for enforcement of the no-strike clause. 63
The conflict between the arbitrator's contractual authority to pro-
vide injunctive relief and the court's refusal to enforce such an award
has not been adequately resolved.64 The state courts in general 5 hold
that they have the authority to enjoin a strike in violation of a no-strike
clause. A California decision held that state courts have concurrent
jurisdiction over Sec. 301 action with the federal courts but must apply
the federal substantive law.66 The court reasoned that the states can
59 Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, supra note 7, at 455 (1957).
60 Supra note 30 (1962).
61 Supra note 45, at 263-64.
62 370 U.S. 195, 82 S. Ct. 1328, 8 L. Ed. 2d 440, 50 L.R.R.M. 240 (1962).
63 Id. at 215.
64 For articles in criticism of Sinclair see: Note, 10 U.C.L.A. L.R. 292 (1963); Aaron,
article, 14 Lab. L.J. 41 (1963), Dannett, article, 16th N.Y.U. Conf. Lab. Law 275
(1963).
65 State courts having anti-injunction statutes or baby Norris-La Guardia Acts
forbid the issuance of the injunction in labor disputes. See N.Y. C. Prac. Act, Art.
51, § 876 (a).
66 McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal. 2d 45, 60,
315 P.2d 322 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932, 41 L.R.R.M. 2431 (1958).
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enjoin a strike in breach of the labor contract, even though the federal
courts are prohibited by Norris-La Guardia from doing so, except where
state law prohibits such an action. 7 The result is that a state court is
free to use state remedies, while applying the federal substantive law.
Another state court held in Ruppert v. Egelhofer68 that the arbitra-
tor can issue an injunction ordering a union to cease a slowdown which
was in violation of the labor contract. The state court reasoned that the
arbitrator's authority was derived from the broad arbitration clause
which gave him authority to render appropriate relief, including injunc-
tive relief, unless prohibited by the contract. The court merely enforced
the arbitrator's decision; it did not grant the injunctive relief. Thus the
New York state anti-injunction statute was held not applicable when
enforcement of the arbitrator's injunctive remedy is sought. Some state
courts hold that they have authority to enjoin a strike in violation of
a no-strike clause because this is not a labor dispute within the meaning
of their statute.69 A Federal District Court has held that it would en-
force the arbitration award, which directed the union to cease and desist
a work stoppage which was in violation of a labor contract, reasoning
that the parties agreed to be bound by the arbitrator's award.70
The Fifth Circuit has held that the arbitrator does not have juris-
diction to decide a violation of a no-strike clause when the subject of the
dispute is not arbitrable, and the collective contract requires arbitrability
as a condition precedent to the no-strike clause becoming operative.
7 1
The Second Circuit has held that an injunction may not be issued
by a federal court in any case involving labor, regardless of the type of
activities against which the injunction is sought.72 Another Federal Dis-
trict Court has held that state court enforcement of an arbitration award
was prohibited by Norris-La Guardia. That court found no distinction
between the court enforcement of an arbitrator's award granting an
injunction and direct application to the court for injunctive relief. 73 The
case further held that the problem of enforcing arbitrators' awards for
violation of no-strike clauses was one for the legislature.
It is evident that in Sinclair, the court held that Sec. 4 of Norris-
La Guardia forbids the federal courts to enjoin peaceful strikes, even
67 Id. at 61.
68 3 N.Y.2d 576, 148 N.E.2d 129, 170 N.Y.S.2d 785, 29 Lab. Arb. 775 (1958).
69 C. D. Perry & Sons Inc. v. Robilotto, 240 N.Y.S.2d 331 (S. Ct. 1963), 53 L.R.R.M.
2156; R.C.A. v. Local 780 I.A.T.S.E., 160 So.2d 150 (Fla. D. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1964),
55 L.R.R.M. 2478.
70 New Orleans Steamship Ass'n v. Longshore Workers (E.D. La. 1962), 49 L.R.R.M.
2941.
71 Gulf & South American Steamship Co. v. Nat'l Maritime Union, 360 F.2d 63 (5th
Cir. 1966).
72 Publishers' Ass'n of New York City v. Mailers' Union, 317 F.2d 624 (2d Cir.
1963). 55 L.R.R.M. 2253.
73 Marine Transport Lines, Inc. v. Curran, 55 L.C. § 11, 748 (1967).
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when such strikes are in violation of a no-strike clause. It is just as
clear that the federal courts have not interpreted Sec. 301, L.M.R.A. as
vitiating the Norris Act.7 4 The states disagree as to whether Sec. 4 of
the Norris Act precludes them from enjoining strikes in violation of
a contractual no-strike clause. Most Federal Courts have not directly
faced the problem since Sinclair, but the recent decisions seem to hint
that they might enforce an arbitrator's injunctive remedy on the basis
that such enforcement is consistent with the National Labor policy, un-
less specific contractual language prohibits such an award. The Supreme
Court held in Drake Bakeries7 5 that an arbitrator has power to award
damages resulting from a violation of a no-strike clause where such
remedial power is within the scope of the board arbitration clause.
Sinclair76 held that no obligation existed to arbitrate a claim for dam-
ages because the arbitration clause was limited to handling grievance
disputes and thus the authority to award damages was not present.
It seems to this writer that in the federal courts the injured party
is relegated to a claim in damages arising from a breach of a contractual
no-strike clause. This is true only where the contract contains a suffi-
ciently broad arbitration clause to enable the arbitrator to fashion such
a remedy. The injured party must therefore establish his compensatory
damages arising from such a breach. Thus the no-strike clause is actually
ineffective to compel arbitration and the struck employer cannot enforce
this agreement to arbitrate. He must sit back and await compensable
damage to occur before he can bring an action to obtain relief. The only
relief which will be enforced is actual damages as punitive damages(previously discussed) is seldom enforced by the courts. The arbitration
proceeding therefore, although referred to as the favored method to de-
rive industrial peace, has little effect upon the most disruptive types of
economic pressure, the strike.
The reluctance of the federal courts concerning enforcement of an
arbitrator's injunctive award is difficult to comprehend in the light of
the arbitrator's contractual power to fashion appropriate remedies. It is
clear that where the language in the contract or submission does not ex-
clude such remedial relief that the arbitrator has the right and the duty
to afford this type of relief.
The problem is that the federal courts and a majority of state courts
will not enforce compliance with such a remedial order. 77 It seems high-
ly unlikely that the party found in violation of the no-strike clause will
74 An accommodation between the Norris-LaGuardia and The Railway Labor Act,45 U.S.C., §§ 151-188, was held to exist by the Supreme Court in Brotherhood ofRailroad Trainsmen v. Chicago River & Ind. Railroad Co., 353 U.S. 30, 77 S.Ct. 635,1 L. Ed. 2d 622, 39 L.R.R.M. 2578 (1957).
•15 Supra note 45.
76 Supra note 62.
77 Avco Corp. Aero Lodge No. 735, Machinists, 376 F.2d 337 (6th Cir. 1967).
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voluntarily comply with the arbitrator's cease and desist order. The
courts, in not providing effective enforcement of such remedies, are
advising the arbitrator that he has no authority to grant such relief,
although his remedy power is derived from the essence of the contract.
Therefore, it is impossible for this writer to reconcile the courts' present
position with that of Enterprise Wheel,78 which sanctioned the arbitra-
tor's remedy power as long as it was derived from the collective bargain-
ing agreement.
The final question that must be answered is whether the National
Labor Relations Board 79 is bound to honor the arbitrator's award in un-
fair labor practicesO cases, that are also a breach of the collective bar-
gaining agreement.
The Board has held that it will honor an arbitrator's award where
(1) the parties agreed to arbitrate the dispute, (2) the arbitration pro-
ceedings were fair and regular, and (3) the award was not adverse to
the policies of the Act."' The Supreme Court held in Smith v. Evening
News Ass'n s 2 that suits brought under Sec. 301 of the L.M.R.A. for vio-
lation of the collective bargaining contract are not pre-empted by the
availability of the Board, even though the activity constituting the
breach is also an unfair labor practice and subject to the Board's juris-
diction.
The Board in its administration of the national labor policy must
accept the arbitration as "a part and parcel of the collective bargaining
process," s3 and voluntarily withhold its undoubted authority to adjudi-
cate alleged unfair labor practice charges involving the same subject
matter. The Board held that while the Board's jurisdiction cannot be
displaced by the arbitrator's award, the policies of the Act will be effec-
tuated by giving credence to such an award, unless the arbitration pro-
ceedings were clearly irregular or the award was repugnant to the poli-
cies of the Act.
Dubo Manufacturing Corp.s4 held that the Board would defer actions
on the unfair labor practice complaint until arbitration of the same dis-
pute, arising out of a collective contract violation, was resolved by the
arbitration panel. Thus the Board will defer hearing a matter under
78 Supra note 19.
79 L.M.R.A. § 10 (a), 61 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 160 (a) (1964) empowers the
Board to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice affecting
commerce, but that other means of adjustment established by agreement or law
does not pre-empt the power of the Board.
80 L.M.R.A. §§ 8 (a), (b), 29 U.S.C.A. 158 (a) (b), list the respective employer and
labor organization unfair labor practices over which the Board has jurisdiction.
81 N.L.R.B. v. Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
82 371 U.S. 195, 83 S. Ct. 267, 46 LC § 17, 961 (1962).
83 U. S. W. v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., supra note 19.
84 142 N.L.R.B. 431 (1963).
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arbitration until after the proceeding, in order to best effectuate the
policies of the Act. It has also been held that where the question to be
resolved by arbitration has been fully tried and decided by the Board's
Trial Examiner, that a stay of the arbitration process will be granted.8 5
The Board does not have to await the court's or the arbitrator's deter-
mination as to the meaning of the collective contracts language, for it
has power to construe contractual provisions even where the contract
does not contain a binding arbitration clause, where it must do so to
decide whether an unfair labor practice exists.8 6 The Supreme Court
has held that where the dispute has been arbitrated before it reaches the
Board that the arbitrators award carries considerable weight.8 ' The
Board must give deference to the arbitrator's award, provided the pro-
cedure is fair and the results not repugnant to the Act. But, if the Board
disagrees with the arbitrator's decision, then the Board ruling takes
precedence. Thus, arbitration is available as an alternative remedy to
an N.L.R.B. proceeding as long as it is consistent with the Board's
policies.
The Board may also defer action and await the rendition of an arbi-
trator's award on an unfair labor practice issue where the arbitration
of the contractual dispute is likely to determine the unfair labor prac-
tice issue in a manner consonant and not repugnant to the policies of the
Act.
This paper has attempted to discover a few of the road blocks which
have been placed in the path of voluntary arbitration of labor contro-
versies. The courts, while sanctioning arbitration as the most practical
and acceptable means devised for the resolution of labor disputes, have
been reluctant to release the arbitrator from their procedural grasp. Thejudiciary is attempting to mold the remedial power of the arbitrator so
that it resembles the power of the courts. They look upon the arbitra-
tion process and subsequent awards as judicial decisions, and not as
industrial solutions to complex industrial problems.
Arbitration is merely a tool of industrial relations agreed to by the
parties in order to arrive at a peaceful settlement of their dispute. As
such, the remedial relief must be diverse, adequate and binding. Many
courts have failed to understand that the traditional remedies which they
dispense are in many instances not adequate for the resolutions of labor
disputes. Nevertheless, the courts caution the arbitrators to stay well
within these traditional remedial boundaries.
85 Kentile, Inc. v. Local 457, Rubber Workers, 228 F. Supp. 541 (E.D.N.Y. 1964).
86 N.L.R.B. v. C.&C. Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421 (1967).
87 Carey v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 84 S. Ct. 401, 11 L. Ed. 2d 320,
48 L.C. § 50,986 (1964).
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